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Investment Analysts’ Forecasts of Earnings
Rocco Ciciretti, Gerald P. Dwyer, and Iftekhar Hasan
The literature on investment analysts’ forecasts of firms’ earnings and their forecast errors is enor-
mous. This paper summarizes the evidence on the distribution of analysts’ forecasts and forecast
errors using data for all U.S. firms from 1990 to 2004. The evidence indicates substantial asymmetry
of earnings, earning forecasts, and forecast errors. There is strong support for average and median
earning forecasts being higher than actual earnings a year before the earnings announcement. Such
differences between earnings and forecasts also exist across time periods and industries. A month
before the earnings announcement, the mean and median differences are small. (JEL G17, C53)
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investors, funding of investor education, and
funding of research by independent analysts.
This settlement brings into question the infor-
mativeness of analysts’ projections of earnings,
suggesting that analysts’ projections of earnings
largely or substantially reflect analysts’ interests
rather than an assessment of a firm’s prospects.
On the other hand, charges of an insider-
trading scheme in 2007 suggest that analysts’ fore-
casts do contain information and affect prices.
This scheme involved an accomplice receiving
advance information about analysts’ forecasts
and taking positions before the announcements
(Smith, Scannell, and Davies, 2007). This scheme
makes no sense if analysts’ forecasts are uninfor-
mative and ignored. While indicating that at least
some analysts’ forecasts may be informative, such
activities do not imply that forecasts cannot be
improved. It is possible to take imperfect infor-
mation and filter out predictable misinformation.
D
o stock analysts provide information
on stocks, or are they merely sales-
people issuing one-sided information
about stocks? In addition to forecast-
ing earnings that are used by some investors
when they buy various firms’ stocks, analysts at
investment banks often have participated in other
activities such as convincing the same firms to
hire the investment bank to issue stock. These
activities were the basis of suits by the New York
attorney general against major investment banks.
Rather than proceeding to trial, the charges were
settled in April 2003. In the settlement, invest-
ment banks agreed to substantial changes in their
business practices designed to provide less incen-
tive for analysts to be influenced by the invest-
ment banks’ other activities. The investment
banks also agreed to make payments totaling
$1.4 billion, which covered fines, payments to
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analysts’ earnings forecasts and actual earnings?
Many papers show that the analysts’ forecast errors
are predictably different from actual earnings.1
The evidence indicates that analysts’ forecasts of
earnings well before the announcement are higher
on average than actual earnings. Whatever earn-
ings an analyst forecasts for a firm, a better predic-
tion is a somewhat lower level of earnings. This
predictable difference is called a “bias” in the
forecasts.2 Some papers also suggest that analysts’
forecasts close to the earnings announcement
decline to less than the actual earnings. The ratio  -
nale for this reverse bias is a suggestion that earn-
ings greater than recent forecasts are interpreted
as a positive earnings surprise and the firm’s
stock price increases. 
This paper provides an overview of analysts’
forecasts and the forecasts’ relationship to actual
earnings. Our data are for U.S. analysts’ forecasts
of U.S. firms’ earnings from 1990 through 2004.
These data show the usual result that analysts’
forecasts are greater than earnings on average. We
look at the distribution in more detail and find that
the distribution of earnings is asymmetric. The
distribution of earnings forecasts also is asymmet-
ric but not sufficiently asymmetric that forecast
errors are symmetric; earnings forecast errors also
are asymmetric. We also find that median forecasts
are closer to actual forecasts than are mean fore-
casts. We examine differences between actual
earnings and earnings forecasts over time and by
industry. We find substantial differences in fore-
cast accuracy across industries and larger forecast
errors during recessions. Fore  cast errors at the 1-




Analysts forecast companies’ earnings per
share, and the forecast error is the difference
between actual earnings and these forecasts of
earnings. There is a scale problem with using the
level of forecasts across firms and over time. A
firm with the same total earnings as another but
half as many shares outstanding will have earn-
ings per share that are twice as large. One way to
adjust for differences in the magnitude of earnings
per share and forecast errors across firms is to
divide the forecast error by the stock price. Divid  -
ing by the stock price assumes that errors in fore-
casting earnings per share relative to the stock
price are relatively homogeneous across firms.
Earnings per share relative to the stock price is
the inverse of the price-to-earnings ratio, often
used as part of the information used to evaluate
companies.3
The forecast error relative to the stock price
is indicated as follows:
(1)
where eT,t
i,j is the computed relative forecast error
for company i by analyst j for year T made t months
before the release date, ai
T is actual earnings per
share of company i in year T, fT,t
i,j is the forecasted
earnings per share for company i by analyst j made
for year T with the forecast being made t months
before the release date, and pi
T–1 is the stock price
for company i at the end of the previous year, T–1.
The forecast horizon, t, is calculated as the
difference in months between the estimation date
(I/B/E/S [Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System]
variable ESTDATX) and the report date (I/B/E/S
variable REPDATX). We use the report date instead
of forecast period end date (FPEDATX) because
analysts can make forecasts between the fiscal
year’s end and the date earnings are reported.
The data on forecasts of earnings per share
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1 Sirri (2004) summarizes a few of these papers and provides references.
2 Not all research agrees that analysts’ forecasts are biased—for
example, Keane and Runkle (1990, 1998).
3 Another way to scale earnings per share is to divide by the level
of earnings to get the proportional error in forecasting earnings.
Earnings close to zero and negative earnings create serious prob-
lems for this normalization. Dividing by earnings can generate a
very large relative forecast error as earnings go to zero; dividing
by negative earnings would change the sign of the forecast error.
Stock prices cannot be negative and are strictly positive in our data.
Although prices can approach zero, earnings generally approach
zero at a related rate, which is another way of saying that earnings
per share relative to the stock price are relatively homogeneous
across firms.Detail History (with Actuals) database for 1990
through 2004. Any company with at least one
forecast between 1990 and 2004 is included in
the initial database.
The stock prices are from the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database
from 1989 to 2003. The earnings in any year are
divided by the stock price at the end of trading
in the prior year. With this choice of stock price,
the stock price does not reflect the changes in
forecasts or the ensuing forecast errors made
during the year.
The initial number of observations on fore-
casts is 1,835,642. To avoid nonsynchronized tim-
ing of forecasts by year, we restrict the analysis to
companies with fiscal years ending in December.4
This reduces the number of observations to
1,207,445. We further restrict our analysis to fore-
casts by analysts located within the United States,
which reduces the number of observations to
678,427 forecasts for 6,731 companies. In this
paper, a company’s stock is defined by the six-digit
Committee on Uniform Securities Identification
Procedures (CUSIP) number followed by an “01”;
this indicates a common stock. We match U.S.
companies from I/B/E/S and CRSP databases by
CUSIP. We also associate an industry code accord-
ing to the Global Industries Classifi  cation Standard
from Standard & Poor’s.
Finally, to eliminate possible transcription
errors, we cut off the distributions of both actual
and forecasted earnings per share relative to the
stock price at the 1st and 99th percentiles for each
year and forecast horizon.5 This results in a dataset
with 662,016 observations for 6,574 companies.
The number of firms included in the analysis
increases over time. The number of U.S. compa-
nies with a fiscal year ending in December and
an earnings’ forecast by at least one U.S. analyst
increased from 1,446 in 1990 to 2,569 in 2004.
The analyses by industry use the industry classi-
fication, which is not available for 104,840 obser-
vations. As a result, the analyses by industry use
557,176 observations instead of the whole sample
of 662,016 observations.
Distribution of Forecast Errors
Figure 1 shows the distributions of earnings
and forecasted earnings. The graphs show the
distribution of actual earnings and the distribution
of forecasts by analysts made 1 month, 6 months,
and 12 months before the earnings announcement.
For example, the first graph (Figure 1A) shows
actual earnings per share relative to the stock price
and forecasts made 1 month before the announce-
ment of earnings. The second graph (Figure 1B)
shows the distribution of earnings and the distri-
bution of the forecasts made 6 months before the
earnings announcement, and the third graph
(Figure 1C) shows the distribution of earnings and
the distribution of the forecasts made 12 months
before the earnings announcement.6 Deleting the
top and bottom 1 percent of the distribution still
leaves quite long tails to the distribution of earn-
ings and, to a lesser but still easily discernible
extent, the forecasts. To avoid obscuring detail,
we also truncate these figures at –$0.50 and +$0.50
per dollar of share price. Table 1 shows the dis-
tribution of earnings, forecasts, and the forecast
errors without the truncation. Relative to the total
number of observations, the truncation excludes
a small number of observations, mostly in the
negative tail of the distributions.
The forecasts and actual earnings are strikingly
similar, which is consistent with the forecasts
being quite informative about actual earnings.
The histograms for forecasts and actual earnings
are distinguishable, but the overlap far outweighs
the differences. The dashed vertical lines are
drawn at the mean of actual earnings. The most
common—modal—values of forecasted and actual
earnings are similar. The solid curves in the figure
represent normal distributions with the same
Ciciretti, Dwyer, Hasan
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4 When looking at data by year, having the same end date means
that the same events are occurring at the same horizon for all firms.
Firms with fiscal years ending in December represent about 74
percent of all firms in the I/B/E/S database.
5 The results in Tables 2 through 4 were computed with the tails of the
distribution of the data included. The results are broadly similar.
6 The distribution of earnings is not the same at each of the horizons.
The figure shows the distribution of all forecasts and the distribu-
tion of the actual earnings that were predicted. Every firm with a
forecast appears in the figure; every firm with no forecast does not
appear in the figure. In addition, every firm with more than one
forecast appears in the figure the same number of times as the
number of its forecasts.Ciciretti, Dwyer, Hasan
548 SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER, PART 2 2009 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW












A. 1-Month Forecast Horizon














Actual Earnings and Earnings ForecastCiciretti, Dwyer, Hasan
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER, PART 2 2009 549














Actual Earnings and Earnings Forecast
Table 1
Summary of Minimum and Maximum Values and Observations Suppressed in Figures 1 and 2 
12-Month horizon 6-Month horizon 1-Month horizon
Number of  Number of  Number of 
suppressed  suppressed  suppressed 
Variable Minimum Maximum observations Minimum Maximum observations Minimum Maximum observations
Actual earnings –1.6137 0.2844 150 –1.1820 0.3350 58 –0.9026 0.2844 11
Earnings forecasts –1.1532 0.2933 76 –0.7732 0.3267 21 –0.6487 0.2778 10
Forecast errors –1.2442 0.7614 89 –1.1561 0.5533 15 –0.6085 0.3531 2
NOTE: For actual earnings and earnings forecasts there are no positive observations outside the –0.5 to +0.5 range. For forecast errors,
there are 6, 2, and 0 excluded positive observations at the 12-, 6-, and 1-month forecast horizons, respectively; the remainder are
negative observations.Ciciretti, Dwyer, Hasan
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A. 1-Month Forecast Horizon
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Forecast Errorsmeans and standard deviations as actual earnings.
Actual and forecasted earnings have higher peaks
at the mean value than the normal distribution
and also have fatter tails. Because the total area
must add up to 100 percent, this implies that the
distributions of actual and forecasted earnings
have fewer observations between the tails and
the center of the distribution.
The graph of the 12-month-ahead forecasts
shows the bias in longer-term forecasts. Although
the distributions of actual and predicted earnings
are quite similar, the histogram shows the ten-
dency of more forecasts of above-average earnings
and fewer forecasts of below-average earnings
than actual earnings. The distribution of the 6-
month-ahead forecasts shows less bias. The dis-
tribution of the 1-month-ahead forecasts is more
similar to the actual earnings.
The literature focuses on the deviations
between the earnings and the forecasts, which
makes it easy to lose sight of how informative the
forecasts are about actual earnings. Analysts’
earnings forecasts are quite informative about
actual earnings.
Figure 2 shows the distributions of the fore-
cast errors. A “positive forecast error” means that
actual earnings exceed the forecasted earnings.
A “negative forecast error” means that actual earn-
ings fall short of the forecasted earnings. If all
analysts forecasted earnings within a penny of
earnings per dollar of share price, all the forecast
errors would be within the two bars surrounding
zero. Recall that the share price is the price before
the start of the fiscal year, so this indicates that
the analysts are coming very close to forecasting
actual earnings. In fact, the forecast errors are
quite peaked near zero, whether 12 months, 6
months, or 1 month before the announcement of
actual earnings.
The earnings forecasts are closer to actual earn-
ings 1 month before the earnings announcement
than 12 months before the earnings announcement.
Ciciretti, Dwyer, Hasan
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER, PART 2 2009 551










C. 12-Month Forecast Horizon
Figure 2, cont’d
Forecast ErrorsCiciretti, Dwyer, Hasan































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.This convergence is expected if the forecasts are
informed predictions. More information becomes
available as time goes on, and this information is
substantial: Eleven-twelfths of the year is past
when the 1-month-ahead forecast is made. Firms
announce earnings quarterly; when the 1-month-
ahead forecast is made, earnings for the first three
quarters of the year have been announced and
are known. Besides this relatively mechanical
effect as time passes, other information becomes
known about earnings as time passes and the
magnitudes of forecast errors can be expected to
decrease.
Over 90 percent of the forecasts made 1 month
before the earnings announcement are within
one penny of earnings per dollar of share price.
There is a clear asymmetry in the distribution of
these close forecast errors: 60 percent of the earn-
ings are more than the forecasts and within a
penny; 30 percent of the earnings are less than
the forecasts and within a penny. The larger num-
ber of positive forecast errors can reflect analysts’
forecasts that the analyst knows are too low; it also
can occur for other reasons. For example, firms
with actual earnings less than forecasted earnings
may provide analysts with information before the
announcement and forecasts are revised accord-
ingly. The forecast errors 12 months ahead and 6
months ahead also show asymmetry, with many
forecasts within a penny of actual earnings but
more above zero than below.
Table 2 shows detailed information about the
distributions of forecast errors by year at 12-month,
6-month, and 1-month horizons. The table shows
the maximum and minimum values, the mean,
standard deviation, measures of the skewness,
and kurtosis of the distribution of forecast errors
and selected percentiles of the distributions.
As Figure 2 suggests, the forecasts a month
before the earnings announcement are much
closer to actual earnings than are forecasts a year
in advance. The standard deviation of forecast
errors is a measure of the size of analysts’ errors,
independent of whether the forecast is above or
below actual earnings. The standard deviation is
substantially larger 12 months before earnings
are announced than 1 month before the earnings
announcement. For example, in 1990, the standard
deviation is 0.0754 at a horizon of 12 months,
0.0669 at a horizon of 6 months, and 0.0342 at a
horizon of 1 month. In 2004, the standard devia-
tion is 0.0317 at a horizon of 12 months, 0.0195
at a horizon of 6 months, and 0.0092 at a horizon
of 1 month.
The mean forecast errors in the table also
decline as the announcement of earnings for the
year approaches. The largest magnitudes of mean
forecast errors in the table are for the 12-month
horizon, –2.7 cents per dollar of share price in
1990 and 2001 and –2.5 cents per dollar of share
price in 1991. The smallest magnitudes of mean
forecast errors are for the 1-month horizon; the
mean forecast error farthest from zero is –0.35
cents per dollar of share price in 1990. The mean
forecast error has been hundredths of a penny per
dollar of share price in most of the years since.
A large segment of the literature examines
these mean forecast errors. The negative mean
forecast errors are statistically significant and not
trivial in magnitude at the 12-month horizon.
Twelve months before earnings are announced,
analysts’ forecasts on average are overestimates
of actual earnings. This overestimation is predict  -
able, in an interesting and specific sense. If only
the earnings forecasts are known a year in advance,
it is predictable that actual earnings will be less
on average. The difference is not large, but it is
not zero and it is predictable. If analysts are
attempting to forecast earnings well on average,
their performance is not as good as it could be.
In standard parlance, the forecasts are biased:
The average forecast error is not zero.
Besides the arithmetic average, the median
is another measure of the typical forecast. The
median is the middle forecast, the forecast that
divides the forecasts into two parts, with half the
observations above the median and half below
the median. The median forecast error is notice-
ably closer to zero than the average forecast error.
This indicates that the typical negative forecast
error is larger in magnitude than the typical posi-
tive forecast error. In other words, as Figure 2
shows, the distribution of forecast errors is not
symmetric. The percentiles of the distribution
clearly show this asymmetry of forecast errors.
The consistently negative values of skewness in
Table 2 also indicate what Figure 2 shows: Nega  -
Ciciretti, Dwyer, Hasan
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the positive errors.7 Consistent with the figures,
the measure of skewness indicates that forecast
errors are skewed toward negative values.
Kurtosis measures how concentrated a distri-
bution is around the mean compared with the
number of observations in the tails of the distri-
bution.8 The positive values for kurtosis indicate
that the tails of the distribution have more obser-
vations than would be suggested by a normal dis-
tribution. Tests for normality of the distribution
of forecast errors uniformly are inconsistent with
a normal distribution.9
Figures 3 and 4 show aspects of the distribu-
tions of forecast errors for all horizons from 1990
to 2004. Figure 3 shows the mean and median
forecast errors as the horizon—the length of time
before the earnings announcement—approaches
zero. It also shows the median in combination with
the 25th and 75th percentiles of the distribution
of forecast errors. The mean forecast errors are
more strongly negative than the medians at long
horizons and consequently show more conver-
gence to zero. The median forecast errors are neg-
ative, with the largest magnitudes in 1990, 1991,
1998, and 2001 (see Figure 4). With the exception
of 1998, these larger-magnitude median forecast
errors are associated with recessions.10 The mean
forecast errors are more strongly negative than
the median forecast errors but decrease to quite
close to zero by 1 month before the earnings
announcement.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of forecast
errors by year by graphing the median forecast
error and the 25th and 75th percentiles of the
distribution for each horizon for each year from
1990 to 2004. The asymmetry of the distributions
is quite apparent. It also is clear that actual earn-
ings fall short of the longer horizon forecasts dur-
ing recessions; this is indicated by the much more
negative forecast errors during the recession years
1990, 1991, and 2001. Given the unpredictability
of recessions, this is not especially surprising. The
figure suggests that the distribution has become
more symmetric over time, although the occur-
rence of recessions clearly is associated with
greater asymmetry.
Table 3 presents the results of tests to deter-
mine whether the apparent skewness in the figures
is statistically significant and consistent across
horizons and years.11 The results of two tests are
presented. The first is the sign test, which deter-
mines whether the median equals the mean. If a
series’ median exceeds its mean, the value of the
statistic is positive. The p-value indicates the prob-
ability of that difference or a larger one if there
really were no difference between the median and
the mean. The second test determines whether
the skewness coefficient is zero. If the skewness
coefficient is zero and moments of the distribution
up to the sixth are finite, then the skewness coef-
ficient has an asymptotic normal distribution that
can be used to construct a test.12
The sign tests indicate an asymmetry in fore-
cast errors that persists from 1990 through 2004.
Tests for the equality of the median and mean at
all horizons are quite inconsistent with the equal-
ity of the two statistics. At the 12-month horizon,
the median forecast error is closer to zero than
the mean for all years from 1990 through 2004;
all of the differences are statistically significant
at any usual significance level. There is some
suggestion that the difference between the mean
and the median has been declining over time.
The difference is far smaller in 2004 than in ear-
lier years but the difference still is statistically
Ciciretti, Dwyer, Hasan
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7 The measure of skewness is the third moment about the mean
divided by the standard deviation cubed.
8 The measure of kurtosis is the fourth moment about the mean
minus 3, all relative to the fourth power of the standard deviation.
9 The test for normality is the Bera-Jarque test (1980). The inconsis-
tency with a normal distribution matches up with the figures and
tables; a normal distribution is symmetric and does not have the
relatively fat tails indicated by the kurtosis statistics. The Bera-
Jarque test statistics are not included in the table because the 
p-values uniformly are inconsistent with a normal distribution
with p-values of 10–8 or below.
10 The National Bureau of Economic Research dates the recession in
1990 and 1991 from July 1990 to March 1991 and the recession in
2001 from March 2001 to November 2001.
11 The observations are repeated measures of forecasts by the same
analysts for the same industries. As Keane and Runkle (1998) argue,
this can introduce dependence in the data, which results in over-
stating the statistical significance of test statistics.
12 The mean of the asymptotic distribution of the skewness coeffi-
cient is zero under the null hypothesis and the variance is from
Gupta (1967, pp. 850-51.)Ciciretti, Dwyer, Hasan
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Forecast Errors by Horizonsignificant. The difference is one-tenth of a penny
per dollar share price in 2004. Given a typical
price-to-earnings ratio of 15 or 20, this implies a
forecast error in earnings on the order of 2 cents
per share per dollar of earnings 12 months ahead.
The tests using the skewness coefficient indi-
cate that deviations from symmetry are persistent
from 1990 through 2004 only at the 12-month
horizon. The null hypothesis of symmetry for
the 12-month horizon cannot be rejected in 2002
at the 5 percent significance level, a result most
simply interpreted as due to chance rather than
anything special about 2002. There is less evi-
dence of overall skewness in any year at the 6-
month horizon and scant evidence of asymmetry
at the 1-month horizon. This is an interesting con-
trast to the results using the median and mean.
While there are statistically significant differences
between the mean and median, the overall skew-
ness of the distribution is less pronounced based
on the third moment, which summarizes the
asymmetry of the distribution.13
Forecasts Errors Across Industries
Forecast errors across firms and analysts are
likely to differ for a variety of reasons, one being
the likelihood that earnings are more predictable
for some industries than others.
Figure 5 shows forecast errors by two-digit
Global Industry Classification System categories.
Forecast errors vary substantially by industry.
All figures have the same scale to facilitate com-
parison of forecast errors across industries. Earn  -
ings in health care are predicted with relatively
Ciciretti, Dwyer, Hasan
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13 Too many rejections of the null hypothesis are possible if data
have high kurtosis (Premaratne and Bera, 2005), as ours do. This
is an issue only at the 12-month horizon because only that horizon
shows rejections. Given the results for the median and mean and
the levels of significance, we are inclined to take the rejections as








25th and 75th Percentiles
Year and Forecast Horizon
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Figure 4
Distribution of Forecast Errors by Year and HorizonCiciretti, Dwyer, Hasan
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Median
25th and 75th Percentiles






















































































25th and 75th Percentiles
Median
25th and 75th Percentiles
Median
25th and 75th Percentiles
Year and Forecast Horizon
Year and Forecast Horizon Year and Forecast Horizon
Materials Industrials
Consumer Discretionary Consumer Staples
Figure 5A
Distribution of Forecast Errors by Year, Horizon, and IndustryCiciretti, Dwyer, Hasan
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Distribution of Forecast Errors by Year, Horizon, and Industrysmall forecast errors, and earnings in energy firms
are predicted particularly poorly. It is plausible
that earnings forecasts in less-volatile industries
are smaller. Energy prices are subject to large
unpredictable price swings, which obviously
affect earnings. Although health care prices have
risen substantially in recent years, the increases
have been relatively persistent and therefore
predictable. Health care is virtually unaffected
by recessions, while the demand for energy falls
in recessions. Some other industries show low
earnings around recessions as well, such as mate-
rials and consumer discretionary goods. If reces-
sions are not predicted, there is little reason to
think that these earnings decreases are predictable
either.
Sign tests not reported in the text are consis-
tent with persistent differences between the
median and means of the forecast errors across
industries but suggest variation in the asymmetry
by industry. The evidence is noticeably weaker
for telecommunications and utilities.
UNBIASEDNESS OF EARNINGS
FORECASTS
Almost all of the existing literature on analysts’
forecasts examines whether their forecasts are
biased and, generally speaking, finds that analysts
overestimate earnings. This overestimation falls
as the earnings announcement approaches, as
indicated in Table 2, but future earnings typically
are noticeably less than the average forecast. Some
evidence and analysis suggests that analysts’ fore-
casts change from overestimates to underestimates
just before the earnings announcement. Such
near-term forecasts are intended to be helpful to
a firm’s management because the announcement
of higher-than-forecasted earnings generates
favorable publicity and a higher stock price after
the announcement.14
Asking for forecasts that are neither too high
nor low on average seems like a relatively simple
Ciciretti, Dwyer, Hasan
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14 This is at least one reason to be dubious about this explanation if
the near-term underestimation of earnings is persistent and predict  -
able. Investors are likely to notice and discount the overestimation
of earnings.request, especially compared with asking that
forecasts be accurate. Even so, it is possible that
analysts process the information available to them
as best as possible, but some or all analysts do not
have an incentive to produce forecasts that are
correct on average.
Analysts’ Incentives and Forecasts
At first glance, it seems obvious that unbiased
forecasts are the best forecasts. A biased forecast
is high or low on average. Such a bias suggests
that the forecast can be improved by adjusting the
forecast by the bias. There are many conditions
in which an unbiased forecast is the best one. 
A common criterion for forecast errors is mean
squared error. If a forecaster wants to minimize the
expected mean squared error of a forecast, then an
unbiased forecast is the best one.15 The expected
squared forecast error applies an increasing penalty
to forecasts farther from the average—a forecast
twice as far from zero is four times as bad.
The unbiased forecast—the mean—is not
necessarily the best forecast in all circumstances.
Suppose that someone is trying to forecast the
value shown when a fair die is thrown. The mean
forecast is the average of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, which
is 3.5. If the forecaster’s earnings depend on how
close the forecast is to the actual value, the best
forecast in fact is 3.5. On the other hand, if the
forecaster gets paid only when the value shown
is the same as the value forecasted, this unbiased
forecast guarantees that the forecaster always loses.
The die will never have the value 3.5. If the fore-
caster is paid when the forecast is the same as the
value thrown and values from 1 to 6 are equally
likely, any integer forecast from 1 to 6 is equally
good and 3.5 never is predicted. While this is a
simple example, the point is more general. The
value forecasted depends on the forecaster’s incen-
tives and the distribution of the data. An unbiased
forecast may not be the “best” forecast.
There also are objectives similar to minimizing
the expected squared error that lead to forecasts
being “biased.” If a forecaster wants to minimize
the expected absolute deviation of the forecast
error, then the median is the best forecast.16
The absolute forecast error applies an increasing
penalty to forecast errors farther from zero—a fore-
cast error twice as far from zero is twice as bad.
The cost of forecast errors increases linearly with
the size of the error. The forecast that minimizes
the expected absolute forecast error is the median,
not the mean (or more precisely, the arithmetic
average). If the mean and the median are the same,
this is a distinction that does not matter. On the
other hand, if the distribution is not symmetric,
as the earnings distribution is not, the median is
a better forecast than the mean if a forecast error’s
cost increases linearly with the forecast error.17
Analysts do not make forecasts in isolation.
Other analysts are making forecasts as well, and
the existence of other forecasts can affect an ana-
lyst’s forecasts in many ways. A simple, common
forecasting game illustrates that an unbiased fore-
cast may not be an analyst’s best forecast. Consider
a forecasting game in which the smallest forecast
error wins and receives a prize; everyone else
receives nothing. Analysts’ situations may be
closer to this game than to isolated forecasts. In
this game, the incentive is to be the closest. If
you are not the closest, then it matters not at all
whether your forecast error is almost as good as the
best or is far away. More generally, any analyst’s
forecast will depend on what he or she thinks
other people will forecast or what others have
already forecasted. A simple example is one in
which two people guess someone else’s pick of a
number between 0 and 10. The unbiased forecast
is 5. Suppose that the first person picks 5. If the
second person picks 5, then he or she cannot win,
only tie. A pick of either 4 or 6 can increase the
expected winnings of the second person if there is
no payoff from tying. Neither 4 nor 6 is unbiased,
but that doesn’t matter. Either number maximizes
expected winnings, and it is winnings that matter.
This suggests that, even if analysts’ forecasts are
biased, it is important to consider analysts’ incen-
tives before denouncing them as “irrational” or
“ignoring information readily available to them.”
Ciciretti, Dwyer, Hasan
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15 A minimum expected squared error forecast minimizes the expected
value of the squared forecast errors.
16 A minimum expected absolute error forecast minimizes the
expected absolute value of the forecast errors.
17 Gu and Wu (2003) discuss this in more detail.Among others, Hong and Kubik (2003), Clarke
and Subramanian (2006), Ottaviani and Sørensen
(2006), and Ljungqvist et al. (2007) highlight fac-
tors that can explain a nonzero predictable fore-
cast error. For example, Clarke and Subramanian
(2006) suggest that an analyst who performs
poorly and is at risk of being fired is more likely
to make a “bold” forecast that is unlikely to be
correct but will save the analyst’s job if it is correct.
Tests for Unbiasedness
The proposition that analysts’ forecasts are
biased is simple to determine with a test of
whether the average difference between actual
earnings and forecasted earnings is zero.18 Given
the evidence above that forecast errors are not
symmetric, it is worthwhile to test whether the
median forecast error is zero, in addition to testing
whether the mean forecast error is zero. A simple
t-test is used for the latter purpose. The test that
analysts’ median forecast errors are zero is the
sign test for deviations from zero.
Table 4 presents the mean and median forecast
errors by industry at the various horizons and
p-values for tests of whether the mean and median
forecast errors are zero. The mean forecast errors
are far smaller at the 1-month horizon than at
longer horizons. At the 12-month horizon, the
mean forecast error indicates that forecasted earn-
ings are greater than actual earnings by about 1
cent per dollar of share price. At the 1-month
horizon, the mean forecast errors indicate that
forecasted earnings are greater than actual earn-
ings by about one-hundredth of a cent per dollar
of stock price.
How big are these forecast errors? Mean earn-
ings for all firms in our data are 2 cents per dollar
of share price; median earnings are 3.9 cents per
dollar of share price. A forecast error of 1 cent per
dollar of share price at the 12-month horizon is
large relative to average earnings of 2 cents. A
forecast error of one-hundredth of a cent at the
1-month horizon is relatively small and not obvi-
ously economically insignificant.
The median forecast error for all industries is
minus nine-hundredths of a cent per dollar of
share price at the 12-month horizon. At the 6-
month and 1-month horizons, the median forecast
errors are minus two-hundredths of a cent per
dollar of share price and three-hundredths of a
dollar per dollar of share price. All these magni-
tudes based on the median are statistically signifi-
cantly different from zero. Median forecast errors
of hundredths of a cent per dollar of share price
are not particularly large relative to median earn-
ings of about 4 cents per dollar of share price.
The means and medians vary substantially
by industry. The mean forecast errors by industry
mirror the overall mean forecast errors, declining
in magnitude as the horizon shortens. The median
forecast errors show substantial variability across
industries in terms of magnitude. At the 1-month
horizon, all of the magnitudes are of the same
small order as the overall median, with the largest
being five-hundredths of a cent per dollar of
share price.
Table 5 shows the results of tests to determine
whether the average and median forecast errors
are zero by year. With the exception of the last
year in the table, 2004, all p-values for testing
whether mean forecast errors are zero at the 12-
month horizon are less than 10–4. All mean fore-
cast errors are negative, indicating that forecasts
on average are greater than actual earnings. Mean
forecasts 6 months ahead look much like the fore-
casts at the 12-month horizon. The forecasts at the
1-month horizon look quite a bit different. At the
1-month horizon, there is little evidence in our
data of bias in the mean forecast: 8 of the 15 fore-
casts are positive and 7 are negative. Nine of the
forecasts are statistically significant at the 5 per-
cent level, but they are not uniformly positive or
negative. There is little evidence to support a con-
clusion that mean forecasts at the 1-month horizon
are uniformly above or below zero.
The median forecasts in Table 5 are closer to
zero than the mean forecasts. The results of the
statistical tests that the median forecasts equal
zero indicate that they are not zero, but the mag-
nitudes generally are hundredths of a cent per
dollar of share price.
At the 12-month horizon, the overall median
forecast error is negative, but this masks interest-
ing variation by year. In five years—1995, 1999,
Ciciretti, Dwyer, Hasan
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02000, 2003, and 2004—the median forecast error
at the 12-month horizon is positive, indicating
that the median forecast is an underestimate of
earnings. This is the opposite of the bias in the
mean forecast. It is interesting that these years
are toward the end of the period. For four years—
1995, 1996, 1999, and 2002—the median forecast
error is not statistically significantly different
from zero at the 5 percent significance level. Two
of these years have positive median forecast errors
and two have negative ones. At this 12-month
horizon, only 8 of the 15 years have median fore-
cast errors that are negative and statistically signifi-
cant. Moreover, of the medians at this 12-month
horizon from 1999 to 2004, only the recession
year 2001 has a negative median forecast error
that is statistically significantly different than
zero; 3 of the 5 years have positive median fore-
cast errors that are statistically significant. These
results are consistent with the median forecast
errors not always being zero, but there is little
support for the median forecasts uniformly being
too high or too low.
At the 6-month horizon, median forecast
errors also provide little support for typical over-
estimation of earnings throughout the period. The
median forecast errors are negative in 8 of the 15
years, barely more than half the 15 years. The
median forecast errors are positive and statistically
significant at the 5 percent significance level in
years 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000, and 2003.
At the 1-month horizon, the median forecast
errors are positive in all years but 1990, a result
consistent with the stylized view in the literature
that forecast errors are underestimates close to
the announcement. It is interesting that our data
support such an inference using medians but pro-
vide much less support with means. All median
forecast errors at the 1-month horizon are quite
small, never larger in magnitude than four-
hundredths of a cent per dollar of share price.
Economically, this is not that far from zero.
CONCLUSION
Our data for U.S. analysts’ forecasts of U.S.
firms’ earnings from 1990 through 2004 show
typical results: Analysts’ forecasts are greater
than earnings on average a year before earnings
are announced. Six months before the earnings
announcements, mean earnings forecasts also are
greater than actual earnings. On the other hand,
median earnings forecasts are about as likely to
be above actual earnings as below them at both
the 12-month and 6-month horizons. A month
before the announcement, mean forecast errors
provide little support for predictable differences
between average earnings and forecasts. Median
forecast errors at the 1-month horizon, though,
generally are positive and statistically significant,
indicating that the analysts’ median forecast is
less than earnings on average. These median
forecast errors are relatively small in magnitude,
though—on the order of hundredths of pennies
of earnings relative to the share price—when
average and median earnings are about 2 and 4
cents, respectively, relative to the share price.
Mean forecast errors and median forecast
errors differ substantially. The distribution of
forecast errors is asymmetric, with mean forecast
errors substantially larger in magnitude than
median forecast errors at the 6-month and 12-
month horizons. The distribution of earnings is
asymmetric. The distribution of earnings forecasts
also is asymmetric but not sufficiently asymmetric
that forecast errors are symmetric. There are sub-
stantial differences in mean and median forecast
errors across industries. We also find substantial
differences in mean and median forecast errors
by year, with the largest forecast errors in reces-
sion years.
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